23
Ethnicity, Race, and a
Possible Humanity
BY ARASH ABIZADEH
A delight of recognition forces me to smile every time I am reminded of the mother whom I saw on television not so long ago. She was recounting how her
daughter—one of her several adopted children of various colors and complexions—had expressed her bewilderment at
the sight before her. “Mum, look at that weird family,” she had exclaimed. “Their kids all look the same!” The child’s puzzlement is delightful because it punctures the
taken-for-granted facade of naturalness that many of us, relying on experiences vastly di²erent from hers, have built around our culturally particular ways of organizing
family and kinship. The world she inhabited was a world without race—though no doubt she has since been confronted with, and perhaps even forced to join, our “raced”
social world.
Of course, ours is a world from whose taken-for-granted, commonsensical perspective the nonexistence of race seems patently
nonsensical. After all, to deny the existence of race is, it seems, to deny the existence of a biological fact. We could imagine a
world—like the girl’s—in which we were unaware of the biological realities, but the biological realities would not thereby disCERTAIN
Copyright © 2002 by Arash Abizadeh.
appear. It would be a world somewhat analogous to one in which humans had not discovered that there are ³sh in the ocean. The
³sh would still be there.
Or would they? Is this bit of our world’s common sense right? Is race something like a ³sh, something that exists out there for the discovering? Precisely this bit of our
world’s common sense is what the girl helps us to call into question. Perhaps race is not a ³sh. It is worth subjecting to critical
scrutiny the two related notions of “ethnicity” and “race” and asking whether a world beyond race is possible.
Ethnic Ambiguities
LET US begin with the facts. I am six feet tall, have dark olive skin, round brown eyes, and wavy black hair and facial hair to match.
But the facts of my appearance have never been enough to ensure uniform guesses about my “ethnicity.” I have been asked by
a friend’s Indian parents from which part of India I come. In Morocco, walking around with a blonde friend, I was asked how long
ago my family had emigrated. But when I walked through the Moroccan ‘súq’ with my Andalucian friend, with her olive skin
and black hair, pedlars barraged me, trying to make a sale to “Juan! Juan! Juan!” in Spanish. In Nice, near France’s border with Italy, my e²orts to speak to the locals in my
accented French were greeted with obliging
24
WORLD ORDER: FALL 2001
responses in a language of which I knew
only enough to be able to tell that I was
being taken for a visitor from across the
border. In Berlin I would not infrequently
be accosted by lost but overly optimistic
old ladies hoping that I could give them
directions in Turkish. My own inquiries for
directions in Israel I prefaced with the hopeful “Do you speak English?”; the usually
puzzled look I would receive was best put
into words by the fellow who responded,
“Yes, and congratulations, apparently you
do too!” The others, too surprised to make
a joke, simply queried, “But are you not
Israeli?” In Vienna my German proved to
be so fumbling at the cash register that the
hurried cashier risked the potentially helpful “Shumá Írání hastín?” [“Are you Iranian?”]. In Bolivia the locals’ guesses about
the fellow who stood head and shoulders
above the ³ve-foot crowd coalesced around
Brazil.
But what are the facts? You want to
know, presumably, not what ethnicity
people guess when they see me but the genealogical facts. From whom am I descended? After all, like race, the concept of
ethnicity is wrapped up with the notion of
descent or genealogy. Whereas the guesses
people might hazard based on physical
appearance may be colored by my clothing,
gait, accent, companions, location, or other
contextual circumstances and ³ltered by
the sociocultural categories through which
the observer sees the world, the fact of genealogy can be, at least in principle, objectively established.
Or can it? If people are of the same
ethnicity, if and only if they are descended
from common ancestors—that is, have a
common genealogy—humanity must be a
single ethnic group. That, of course, is not
how the term “ethnicity” is used. Presumably the ancestors in question must be ones
who lived sometime later than the ³rst
Homo sapiens. The question is, How much
later? The answer to this question is, in
part, arbitrary.
Let us return to the facts. One is that
I live in the United States. Surely this fact
does not help the inquirer after my ethnicity.
Another fact is that I am from Canada. If
I were ever to become a United States citizen, I would become an American of Canadian background. But presumably this still
does not answer the ethnicity question.
Canadians are descended from common
ancestors only in the sense in which all
humans are descended from the ³rst Homo
sapiens. Yet another fact is that I am born
of Iranian parents. Surely this is the relevant fact. I am descended from Iranians,
and so we might con³dently conclude that
my ethnic background is Iranian. The
problem with this answer is that Iranians
themselves do not seem to think that they
all share common ancestors. My parents are
Iranian, to be sure; but they are of Jewish
descent—not Kurdish, not Baluchi, not
Qashqai, not Persian, not Turkmen, not Armenian. Is, then, my ethnic background
Jewish-Iranian? Perhaps we should simply
say that my ethnicity is Jewish, or Hebrew,
a descendant of the twelve tribes of Israel?
But if we have gone back that far, why not
push a little further? Is my ethnic background simply Semitic, in common with
Jews but also with Arabs? Why not push
even further, to the ³rst Homo sapiens?
The choice of “how far back” begins to
verge on the arbitrary.
It is not just the “how-far-back” question that introduces arbitrariness. One could
also ask questions about which genealogical
line is to be considered decisive. One generation back, we have two choices—mother
and father. Two generations back, we have
four. Three generations back, we have eight,
and soon the numbers become unimaginable. Perhaps I do, indeed, have an ancestor
among the twelve tribes. But of the thousands of my ancestors who lived that far
ETHNICITY, RACE, AND A POSSIBLE HUMANITY
back, many of them also are, in fact, through
some genealogical line or another, ancestors
of thousands, if not millions, of humans
alive today who do not think of themselves
as being of my “blood.” But why this line
rather than that?
It is in part for these reasons that many
scholars have begun to de³ne ethnicity as
constituted by myths of common descent.
A people share a common ethnicity insofar
as they share a myth of common descent—
that is, insofar as they believe themselves to
be descended from common ancestors. 1
Ethnicity is based on mythical beliefs about
the genealogical facts, not the genealogical
facts themselves. It is the myths that answer the “how-far-back” and the “whichline” questions—but the myths themselves
1. See Donald L. Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Con·ict (Berkeley, CA: U of California P, 1985) and Anthony D. Smith, The Ethnic Origins of Nations (Oxford,
UK: Blackwell, 1986).
2. The term “socially constructed” refers to phenomena the existence and character of which depend
on there being certain ways of doing and thinking
about things that are speci³c to certain societies or
historical periods. Usually the contrast is with things
that have a purely “natural,” “innate,” or “biological”
basis. For example, for most scholars sex is a biological
category that distinguishes “males” and “females” purely
in terms of X and Y chromosomes, while gender is a
socially constructed category that distinguishes “men”
from “women” in terms of the roles, characteristics,
and identities that they take on in particular societies.
In other words, the de³ning characteristics of a “man”
and “woman” vary according to the particular society. A
simpli³cation illustrates the point. In one society a
woman is a person who is a mother who rears children
in a domestic sphere, who is obedient to men, who
speaks only when spoken to, who is deemed to be
irrational and emotional, and so on, while in another
society the pursuit of a career, assertiveness, political
o¹ce, and so on are perfectly compatible with womanhood. (The Bábí heroine øáhirih, for example, challenged the very idea of what it meant to be a woman in
nineteenth-century Persia.) Both the de³ning features
and the very existence of a socially constructed category depend on the context.
25
can often be based on historically inaccurate beliefs. This, of course, does not mean
that ethnicity itself does not exist. Rather,
it simply means that when it exists, it exists
as a socially constructed category contingent on beliefs.2 The “facts” of genealogy
are themselves an insu¹cient basis for dividing humanity up ethnically. Unlike a
³sh, ethnicity’s very existence is dependent
on beliefs about its existence.
Racy Looks
PERHAPS the concept of “race” enjoys an
advantage over ethnicity. For “race” can be
thought of as a concept that combines two
ideas. It supplements the notion of genealogy with the notion of some innate traits
that are genealogically transmitted. Thus,
for example, members of the same race
could be de³ned as humans who share
common ancestors from whom they have
inherited some innate traits, such as phenotype (physical appearance). The “howfar-back” question can then be answered
“objectively” by referring to the relevant
traits—for example, the point in time when
a certain set of phenotypic traits, such as
pale skin, straight hair, and so on, came to
distinguish one group of humans physically from others groups. The “which-line”
question can also be similarly answered.
One traces race along the line that determines the inheritance of the relevant innate racially marked qualities. By supplementing the ethnic criterion of genealogy,
the second criterion—the inherited innate
traits—is supposed to provide “race” with
an objective (and in the case of phenotype,
a biological) ground. Race, like a ³sh, could
then be said to exist independently of any
beliefs about it.
The assumption embedded in such a
conception of race is, of course, that its
two constitutive criteria—genealogy and
inherited innate traits such as phenotype—
are compatible. In other words, the assump-
26
WORLD ORDER: FALL 2001
tion is that, when attempting to determine
someone’s race, examining his or her phenotype provides answers that supplement
rather than undermine answers to questions about genealogy. 3 The ostensible
advantage of “race” over ethnicity is that
the additional question about distinctive
innate traits passed on through descent would
serve to wrestle the concept away from myth
and deliver it to the objectivity of sciences
such as biology.
The problem is that, in fact, the two
questions about genealogy and innate traits
such as phenotype often provide contradictory answers. The commonly accepted advantage turns out to be a liability. Consider
the American context. In the United States
a person of “black” race is understood to
be someone of sub-Saharan African ancestry who, as a result of that ancestry, has
inherited certain phenotypic traits (dark
skin, kinky hair, and so on). Hence there
are two ways to determine if someone is
“black”: to ask about the person’s ancestry
and to see what he or she “looks” like. (Both
questions are supposed to yield the same
answer.) With respect to the “which-line”
question, the United States answers with its
infamous “one-drop” rule. If one has but
a single black African ancestor, in the
American context one has traditionally been
deemed to be of “black” race. But consider
3. Phenotype is one of the most typical inherited
innate qualities associated with race, but other traits
are also possible, such as genotype (that is, genetic
makeup) and some supposed “essence” (compare, for
example, the Afrocentric view of race) or natural dispositions of character. For simplicity, I will focus on
phenotype, in accordance with everyday American social practice.
4. In Jane Doe v. State of Louisiana. See F. Janes
Davis, Who Is Black? One Nation’s De³nition (University
Park: Pennsylvania State UP, 1980) 9–11.
the case of Susie Phipps. Along with her
siblings, some of whom were blue-eyed
blondes, she had lived socially as “white”
in Louisiana by virtue of her phenotype.
When she checked white on her application, however, Phipps was denied a passport because the state considered her “colored” by virtue of her genealogy. She then
sued to be o¹cially classi³ed as white.4 She
lost, but the lawsuit was made possible by
the fact that the two categories—phenotype and genealogy—of race need not coincide.
But, perhaps, it will be objected, the
problem is not with the category of race
per se but with the peculiar way that Americans answer the “which-line” question.
Instead of monolithic racial categories that
are preserved by always tracing race along
the “black” line, one might argue for allowing for “racial mixture.” Having ostensibly
established the existence of di²erent races
by reference to genealogy and phenotype,
one could then speak of people of “mixed
race.” But here again the two questions can
pull in di²erent directions. Consider Phipps
again. The genealogical answer is that she
is of “mixed race,” while the phenotypic
answer is that she is “white.” The discrepancy has not been erased by this re³nement.
What happens if one allows the phenotypic answer to trump the genealogical one?
(“For all intents and purposes,” it might be
said, “the woman is biologically white.”)
This would mean that phenotype is also
decisively answering the genealogy questions, such as “which line” or “how far
back.” But then phenotype seems to be
doing all the work, whereas the discussion
of ethnicity attempted to show why phenotype could not be su¹cient grounds for
an objective “biological” distinction.
How does the insu¹ciency problem
work in the context of race? The attempt
to determine race biologically by reference
to some phenotypic qualities faces at least
ETHNICITY, RACE, AND A POSSIBLE HUMANITY
two problems.5 First, phenotypic di²erences
are matters of degree. Exactly where one
should draw the racial boundary cannot be
determined on purely biological grounds.
As a result, a person deemed to be phenotypically “black” in the United States may
be deemed phenotypically “white” in Jamaica. Second, humans vary in a multitude
of ways—from hair color to hand size to
nail shape. Which of these traits is deemed
to be a relevant marker of distinction will
be contingent upon the particular society
in which the distinction is made.
For these reasons, among others, it has
now become a commonplace among academic scholars that “race” is a social construct—that it is not determined by biology.6 The implication is that “race” in U.S.
society may be entirely di²erent from “race”
in Brazilian or Moroccan society. Another
implication is that “race” does not exist independent of social beliefs about race.
The no-nonsense commonsense response
to the academy’s (majority) view would be,
no doubt, to point to some obvious biological facts. I may have been variously
taken for Indian, Italian, Latino, Arab, Israeli,
and so on, but I have never been mistaken
for Japanese. Surely race cannot be com-
5. So, too, for that matter, would an attempt to do
so by reference to genotype.
6. For a discussion of some of the literature on the
social construction of race, see “Race: Neither Biological Fact nor Social Fiction” by Algernon Austin in this
issue of World Order, 33.1 (Fall 2001): 9–20. For a
discussion of the lack of a genetic basis for the category
of race, see K. Anthony Appiah, “The Uncompleted
Argument: Du Bois and the Illusion of Race,” in “Race,”
Writing, and Di²erence, ed. Henry Louis Gates, Jr.
(Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1986) 21–37. Appiah also
notes that, while not all contemporary biologists agree
that there are no distinct human “races,” those biologists who believe that there is a genetic basis for race
mean something quite di²erent by “race” than its denotation in popular usage.
27
pletely independent of the biologic al
“facts”? Of course, there is a kernel of truth
to this bit of common sense. Race may be
socially constructed, but it is socially constructed by reference to biological facts
that provide it with raw materials. The
point is that race may be used to categorize
people socially according to some phenotypic traits, but which traits are used as
markers of di²erence and how those traits
are perceived depends on the social context.
Hence, on the one hand, race’s relation to
biology is not wholly arbitrary. Its construction does make reference to some
biological facts. That is why, for example,
I have never been taken for Japanese. Race
is not just “made up” independent of any
reference to biological traits. On the other
hand, race is not wholly determined by
biology. Its social construction is dependent upon arbitrarily selecting some traits,
rather than others, for special treatment.
For example, while skin color is often thought
of as a racial marker, di²erent humans may
have also inherited blonde, brown, red, or
black hair, without their hair color being
thought of as a racial marker. Humans vary
not just in skin color but also in height,
hirsuteness, left-handedness, ³nger-nail
shape, foot size, and so on. These are all
inherited biological traits. Whether they
are socially thought of as relevant for categorizing human groups depends on the
context. (A society that viewed its smallfooted individuals as an inferior breed of
some sort is no less absurd than South
African apartheid.) A society in which
phenotypic traits such as skin color were
deemed to be just as irrelevant to grouping
humans as left-handedness is in our world
would be a society without “race” as we
understand it. Race—like ethnicity—is
rather unlike a ³sh.
The insight that race is socially constructed is what lies behind contemporary
race theory’s reversal of the assumptions
28
WORLD ORDER: FALL 2001
that were used to justify the American
practice of slavery. Whereas for generations
racial di²erence was cited in America as the
basis and justi³cation for slavery, contemporary theory suggests that it was rather the
practice of slavery itself that created race
in America as we know it. The result is
this: Despite race’s dependence upon beliefs, a person cannot simply “think” it
away.7 The reason is that the existence of
7. One of the most striking example of this comes
from Nazi Germany. Before Hitler’s rise, there were
many fully assimilated Germans with Jewish ancestors
who did not subjectively identify themselves as Jews at
all; some were not even aware of their Jewish ancestry.
But then the sociopolitical context changed, and the
Nazis brutally imposed a Jewish identity on these individuals. Even though Jewishness had not been a part of
their identity, after surviving the Holocaust, many of
these individuals then saw Jewishness as a central component of their identity. The point is that even our
subjective identi³cations are dependent on the social
context.
8. As the political philosopher Charles Taylor has
put it with respect to intersubjective meanings: “It is
not just that people in our society all or mostly have a
given set of ideas in their heads and subscribe to a given
set of goals. The meanings and norms implicit in these
practices are not just in the minds of the actors but are
there in the practices themselves” (“Interpretation and
the Sciences of Man,” in Philosophy and the Human
Sciences: Philosophical Papers 2 [Cambridge, UK: Cambridge UP, 1985] 36).
9. A person’s individual identity answers to the question, “Who am I?” A collective identity answers to the
question, “Who are we?” Whereas a person’s individual
identity distinguishes that person from others, a collective identity is an identity shared in common with other
individuals.
10. Speaking of collective identity more generally,
Appiah notes that “The large collective identities that
call for recognition come with notions of how a proper
person of that kind behaves. . . .” “Collective identities,” he concludes, “provide what we might call scripts:
narratives that people use in shaping their life plans”
(K. Anthony Appiah, “Identity, Authenticity, Survival:
Multicultural Societies and Social Reproduction,” in
Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition,
ed. Amy Gutmann [Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 1994]
149–63, 159–60).
race is not dependent upon subjective beliefs (that is, beliefs held by an individual).
Rather, it depends on intersubjective beliefs
and meanings embedded within social
practices that continually reproduce race
(that is, beliefs and meanings embodied
and re·ected in shared social practices, just
as the belief in certain kinds of rights are
embedded in American practices).8
The result is that race is a social fact. A
de-racialized world would require not just
a transformation of people’s beliefs but also
a transformation of the social practices that
sustain those beliefs—practices implicated
in a web of material and symbolic relations
of power.
Reproducing Race
TO IMAGINE a world beyond racial oppression and injustice is not, de³nitionally, to
imagine a world beyond race. But it is
di¹cult to see how racial di²erentiation
could in practice be sustained without the
attending oppressions and injustices. This
is in part because, for race to exist, it must
be sustained by social practices that police—and enforce—its collective boundaries that distinguish “us” from “them.”
Since biology is itself an insu¹cient basis
for racial categorization and identity, race
and racial identity depend upon social
practices that supplement biology by contingently choosing some traits, such as skin
color or forehead size, as distinguishing
marks of racial di²erence. As a result, we
need to shift our focus from the conceptual
realm of de³ning race to analyzing the social
realm in which race is institutionalized in
social practices. It then becomes evident
that reproducing race as the basis for collective identities9 depends on the (often
coercive) enforcement of racial boundaries
that distinguish one group from another,
along with the racialized modes of behavior
associated with each group.10
It may be helpful to distinguish three
ETHNICITY, RACE, AND A POSSIBLE HUMANITY
levels of analysis relevant to reproducing
racial identity.11 First, there is the politicolegal sphere of the state, which the sociologist Max Weber de³ned as the set of institutions “that (successfully) claims the
monopoly of the legitimate use of physical
force within a given territory.”12 Second,
there is the sphere of society, including (a)
the economic sphere of the production, exchange, and distribution of goods and services, (b) the public sphere, in which individuals who do not personally know one
another interact on a communicative basis,
and (c) the intimate or private sphere of the
family and interpersonal relations. Finally,
there is the subjective sphere of the indi-
11. The categories are adapted in part from Jürgen
Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, vol. 2
(Boston: Beacon P, 1987) and Nancy Fraser, “What’s
Critical about Critical Theory? The Case of Habermas
and Gender,” in Unruly Practices: Power, Discourse, and
Gender in Contemporary Social Theory (Minneapolis: U
of Minnesota P, 1989), 113–43.
12. Max Weber, From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, trans. H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (New
York: Oxford UP, 1946) 78, emphasis removed. After
noting that “There is a great deal of agreement amongst
social scientists as to how the state should be de³ned,”
John A. Hall and G. John Ikenberry (in The State
[Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 1989] 1–2) specify
three de³ning elements: (1) “the state is a set of institutions . . . manned by the state’s own personnel” whose
“most important institution is that of the means of
violence and coercion,” (2) “these institutions are at the
centre of a geographically-bounded territory,” and (3)
“the state monopolizes rule making within its territory.”
13. For an analysis of the individual psychological
dimension of the race question, see “Children and
Racism: The Complexities of Culture and Cognition”
by David Diehl and Elizabeth Ansel Kirsch in this issue
of World Order, 33.1 (Fall 2001): 37–48.
14. Rogers Brubaker’s theoretical analysis of the
role of the state in the production of ethnic and
national identities is also germane for analyses of racial
identity. See Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the
National Question in the New Europe (Cambridge, UK:
Cambridge UP, 1996) ch. 1.
29
vidual (which encompasses the psychological processes of personality- and ego- formation). It should be emphasized that the
public sphere operates through cultural and
social structures—including secondary associations, such as professional associations,
sports teams, religious communities, universities, and so on, that as a whole make
up civil society. All three spheres help reproduce race, but in this exploration I focus
on the ³rst two—the state and society.13
One of the most obvious underpinnings
of the social practices that help sustain and
reproduce a “raced” world is the legal
apparatus of the state. When race is institutionalized at the level of the state—as it
overtly and oppressively was in apartheid
and in the pre-civil rights era in the United
States—the state itself becomes a key player
in the (re)production of race and racial
identities.14 In the face of overt state-sanctioned racial oppression, an obvious political strategy for achieving racial justice is to
attempt to transform the political and legal
system so that the state treats all individuals as equal before the law irrespective of
racial categorization—in other words, to
render it “color-blind.” The limit to this
approach is, of course, that the state is not
the only source of race and racial oppression. However color-blind the state may be,
discriminatory and oppressive practices may
continue to emanate from society.
Hence we must consider not just the
state’s role in the production of race but
also the oppressive structures within society itself. Here again there is a partial
political remedy. The legal apparatus of
the state may be deployed to sanction
discriminatory social practices—for example,
through the enforcement of a set of antidiscrimination rights. The limit to this
approach stems from the fact that the overt
racial discrimination that is susceptible to
state action through the protection of individual rights is not the only social source
30
WORLD ORDER: FALL 2001
of racial oppression and inequality. For
society also has a material economic aspect,
and even if individual rights were protected,
once class and race have become intertwined,
unequal class structures may serve to perpetuate racial inequalities as well (and vice
versa). The point is that class con·icts and
inequalities are often an important source
for the social (re)production of race, and
state protection of classic liberal rights can
often do little to alleviate them. There may
be, for example, laws against racial discrimination in university admissions, but
if some individuals cannot a²ord to pay
high tuition rates, or if their impoverished
background has interfered with academic
excellence in secondary school, these individuals may still be e²ectively barred from
the sort of higher education necessary to
enter certain professions.
Again, there is a potential political remedy. The state may be called upon to undo
the correlation between class and race, for
example through a¹rmative–action policies and economic redistribution. But however e²ective or necessary such policies may
be, they have their own inevitable pathology. In the state’s attempt to undo the
correlation between class and race—and
thus to undercut the economic reproduction of race—the state paradoxically ends
up reproducing race politically. For the state’s
15. This insight stems from one that lies at the heart
of one of the foundational works of modern social
theory, in the form of Hegel’s analysis of how, under
conditions of modernity, civil society systematically
denies to the “rabble” the very bases for “personality”
that modern society itself cultivates in human beings.
See Shlomo Avineri, Hegel’s Theory of the Modern State
(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge UP, 1972) 149–50.
16. See Charles Taylor, “The Politics of Recognition,” in Multiculturalism 25–73 and Habermas, Theory
of Communicative Action vol. 2.
17. See Appiah, “Identity, Authenticity, Survival,” in
Multiculturalism 149–63, 161.
interventions in society are mediated
through a bureaucracy that must make use
of, and thus mobilize and institutionalize,
the very category it seeks to undercut. The
result is that once it has already been institutionalized in society, the problem of
race calls for a more fundamental assessment than the solely political or economic.
We must consider not just the oppressive
political and material sources of the production of race but also the nature of the
spiritual aspiration to human dignity that
modern society itself cultivates among its
members, even as its oppressive social structures continue to o²end it.15
It might be objected that a distinction
needs to be made between the oppressive
reproduction of race and the reproduction
of race as such. However, as noted earlier,
the two may be inextricably linked in
practice. We can see how the production
of race is linked to oppression rather clearly
when outsiders, whether the state or other
social actors, impose a racial identity on
their victims through racial discrimination
and exclusion. But the link to oppression
is no less important for racial identities sustained by practices of social control within
the group itself. These two modes of reproducing identity—internal and external—
often reinforce each other. Since our individual and collective identities are always
shaped through our interactions with other
human beings,16 and since societies have
often denied equal dignity to some human
beings on the basis of racially marked
characteristics, it is no surprise that these
human beings have found such characteristics central, even if negatively so, to their
identities.17 With much compassion, the
philosopher K. Anthony Appiah notes how
this external imposition is often complemented by the second, internal mode of
reproduction. One way to a¹rm one’s equal
dignity as a human being is to revalue
socially enforced collective identities, not
ETHNICITY, RACE, AND A POSSIBLE HUMANITY
as sources of humiliation and insult, but
as valuable sources central to one’s identity—indeed, the very source of one’s
dignity:
In order to construct a life with dignity,
it seems natural to take the collective
identity and construct positive life-scripts
instead. . . . In this context, . . . [it] will
not even be enough to require being
treated with equal dignity despite being
Black, for that will require a concession
18. Appiah, “Identity, Authenticity, Survival” in
Multiculturalism 161. Bahá’ís may recall ‘Abdu’l-Bahá’s
subversion of twentieth-century American racism
through a revaluation of blackness as a source of pride
rather than shame. Howard Colby Ives recounts the
story of ‘Abdu’l-Bahá’s visit to the Bowery Mission area
in New York in 1912. Among a number of poor boys
who had come to see ‘Abdu’l-Bahá was a single black
boy, who was probably expecting to be unwelcome
because of his race. “‘When ‘Abdu’l-Bahá saw him,’”
Ives reports,
His face lighted up with a heavenly smile. He raised
His hand with a gesture of princely welcome and
exclaimed in a loud voice so that none could fail to
hear; that here was a black rose.
The room fell into instant silence. The black
face became illumined with a happiness and love
hardly of this world. The other boys looked at him
with new eyes. I venture to say that he had been
called a black—many things, but never before a
black rose (Howard Colby Ives, Portals to Freedom,
rev. ed. [London: George Ronald, 1976] 65).
See also Richard W. Thomas’s discussion of this incident and of ‘Abdu’l-Baha’s approach in general in Racial
Unity: An Imperative for Social Progress (Ottawa: Association for Bahá’í Studies, 1993) 123–24, Ch. 8.
19. The concept of rei³cation ³nds its sources in
Marx and Georg Lukács, an Hungarian Marxist philosopher. Rei³cation refers to a process by which individuals think of and treat something as if it were
natural, even though, in fact, it is socially constructed
and thus a contingent feature of the individual’s society. To return to th